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MANUSCRIPT DETAILS
: Securing Intellectual Capital: An Exploratory Study in Australian Universities
:investigate the links between IC and the protection of data, information and knowledge in universities, 
as organizations with unique knowledge-related foci and challenges.gathered insights from existing 
IC-related research publications to delineate key foundational aspects of IC, identify and propose links to 
traditional information security that impact the protection of IC. We conducted interviews with key 
stakeholders in Australian universities in order to validate these links.investigation revealed two kinds of 
embeddedness characterizing the organizational fabric of universities: (1) vertical and (2) horizontal, 
with an emphasis on the connection between these and IC-related knowledge protection within these 
institutions.is a need to acknowledge the different roles played by actors within the university, and the 
relevance of information security to IC-related preservation.information security as an IC-related issue 
can help IT security managers communicate the need for knowledge security with executives in higher 
education, and secure funding to preserve and secure such IC-related knowledge, once its value is 
recognized.is one of the first studies to explore the connections between data and information security 
and the three core components of ICâ€™s knowledge security in the university context.
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Securing Intellectual Capital: An Exploratory Study in Australian Universities
Structured Abstract: 
Purpose – To investigate the links between IC and the protection of data, information and 
knowledge in universities, as organizations with unique knowledge-related foci and 
challenges. 
Design/methodology/approach – We gathered insights from existing IC-related research 
publications to delineate key foundational aspects of IC, identify and propose links to 
traditional information security that impact the protection of IC. We conducted interviews 
with key stakeholders in Australian universities in order to validate these links. 
Findings – Our investigation revealed two kinds of embeddedness characterizing the 
organizational fabric of universities: (1) vertical and (2) horizontal, with an emphasis on the 
connection between these and IC-related knowledge protection within these institutions. 
Research implications – There is a need to acknowledge the different roles played by actors 
within the university, and the relevance of information security to IC-related preservation.
Practical implications – Framing information security as an IC-related issue can help IT 
security managers communicate the need for knowledge security with executives in higher 
education, and secure funding to preserve and secure such IC-related knowledge, once its 
value is recognized.
Originality/value – This is one of the first studies to explore the connections between data 
and information security and the three core components of IC’s knowledge security in the 
university context.
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Keywords: Intellectual capital, Data security, Information security, Knowledge security, 
Cyber security, Higher education, University.
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Intellectual Capital (IC) is the stock of knowledge held by an organization (Dierickx and Cool, 
1989), and is made up of three components: human capital (HC) (the product of individual 
intellectual action, i.e. individual tacit knowledge), structural capital (SC) (organizational 
processes, systems and routines that structure intellectual assets into group property), and 
relational/customer capital (RC) (understanding of ex-firm intangibles) (Bontis, 1998). 
Knowledge is at the core of IC (Stewart, 1997; Renaud et al., 2019) with organizations being 
considered “repositories and coordinators of intellect” (Quinn, 1992, p. 241), this being 
intrinsically linked to organizations’ economic wealth and value creation (Paloma Sánchez 
and Elena, 2006). There is a growing interest (in both research and practice) into the role of 
IC in educational institutions (Bisogno et al., 2018) and particularly in Higher Education (HE) 
(Paloma Sánchez et al., 2009), where IC management is crucially important, given the 
knowledge-focused nature of their activities (Secundo et al., 2015).
Reflecting this focus, a burgeoning stream of research has been dedicated to the 
study of IC components in universities. Five distinct stages of IC research have emerged 
(Bisogno et al., 2018; Secundo et al., 2018) but none of these is specifically linked to the 
preservation of IC, as impacted by the cyber era.  Yet, as we will argue, universities are 
exposed to significant challenges in terms of securing their IC-related data, information and 
knowledge. Many universities have long histories, and existing structural assets, whose 
contribution to the value creation process is undeniably significant (Di Berardino and Corsi, 
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2018). Yet, it is important also to consider how universities secure their data, information 
and knowledge, given that their existing infrastructures are likely to pre-date cyber-attacks. 
We need to examine the ways in which universities traditionally transmit and disseminate 
knowledge, and consider how these practices are impacted by the security requirements of 
the cyber era. In this paper, we reveal connections between IC-related knowledge security 
and traditional information security, which is generally concerned with the preservation of 
data and information. The study of knowledge security (Desouza and Vanapalli, 2005), is 
relatively immature (Desouza, 2006; Renaud et al., 2019), and, given the importance of IC 
within universities, we believe greater insights into this topic would be valuable to the HE  
sector as a whole. 
Section 2 of this paper defines he IC concept and explores the related literature. We 
also consider extant methods of data and information security, i.e. the protection of the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of data/information (the so-called CIA properties) 
(Von Solms and Van Niekerk, 2013) and links to knowledge security. We shall argue that the 
very nature of HE presents significant challenges when it comes to securing both data and 
information (Bongiovanni, 2019) and, inevitably, also organizational knowledge. Intrinsically, 
cyber security and HE seem subject to diametrically opposing pressures: on the one hand, 
there is the need to protect data, information and knowledge to preserve the three 
components of IC. On the other hand, there is a strong drive to share knowledge, to foster 
innovation and create international links and research collaborations across legislative 
boundaries.
Section 3 outlines our research framework and explains how we carried out our 
research. Section 4 presents our findings and Section 5 discusses them, and presents a 
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conceptualization of IC’s links to information security within knowledge-intensive 
institutions such as universities. Specifically, we unpack IC’s three foundational components 
and explain how these are influenced by extant data and information security practices in 
10 Australian universities and one major research center. Section 6 concludes the paper and 
suggests directions for further research.
2. Review of the literature
2.1 Data, information and knowledge as constituents of Intellectual Capital
Researchers have conceptualized IC in different ways. Stewart (1997) aligns IC with 
knowledge, information, data and Intellectual Property. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998)  
describe IC as knowledge and knowing capability, whereas Dierickx & Cool (1989) refer to IC 
as “stock of knowledge”. Asiaei and Jusoh (2015) mention IC’s link to know-how and 
knowledge of manpower, databases, information technology, operating processes, 
customer relationships, brand, trust and cultures. 
Researchers and practitioners alike have also identified ways to operationalize IC, to 
conceive it as a construct, with the purpose of measuring, assessing and preserving it. Bontis 
(1998) argues that IC is composed of three sub-categories of capital: human, structural, and 
customer/relational (HC, SC and RC). Human capital (human resources plus intellectual 
assets, Edvinsson and Sullivan, 1996) refers to the individual tacit knowledge possessed by 
the members of an organization, necessary for them to perform their functions and tasks. 
Structural (or organizational) capital refers to the structural tacit knowledge ingrained in the 
organization: mechanisms, structures, and cultures, which support individuals in their quest 
for superior intellectual performance. Customer (or relational) capital relates to the external 
dimension of organizations and is constituted by knowledge of marketing channels and 
customers. Central to the construct of IC are the concepts of data, information and 
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knowledge, these three existing in a specific structure. Data constitute raw facts and 
numbers which, once given meaning, become information. This, in turn, becomes 
knowledge when patterns are recognized within the information (Dretske, 1981). The 
importance of the relationship between the data-information-knowledge triad and IC has 
been stressed by Bontis (1998), who has described information as the raw product, 
knowledge as the finished product and IC as knowledge utilized to produce value. More 
recently, Tien (2013) maintained the hierarchical nature of the relationship and justified 
data analysis activities as an attempt to produce information from data; knowledge from 
information; and wisdom from knowledge. The emergence of innovative applications of 
modern technologies has led some authors to re-consider this relationship. For example, in 
the case of Big Data, information is conceived as structured data to be useful and relevant 
for a specific purpose. Subsequently, information, not data, prevails as the fundamental fuel 
of the Big Data society (De Mauro et al., 2016). 
Other authors conceptualize the data-information-knowledge structure differently. 
Drawing inspiration from the work of Tuomi (1999), Alavi and Leidner (2001) postulate a 
bidirectional connection between information and knowledge, whereby the former 
becomes the latter once processed in an individual’s mind and vice versa: the latter 
becomes the former once codified. The authors contend that knowledge does not exist 
outside an individual’s mind and can be conceived as a capability. As such, knowledge 
management is basically intended to create IC and information systems act in support of 
knowledge management by developing individual and organizational competencies and 
reinforcing the fragile knowledge sharing connections existing in organizations (Alavi and 
Leidner, 2001). At their core, knowledge management systems support the creation, storage 
& retrieval, transfer and application of knowledge (Schultze and Leidner, 2002).
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In their literature review, Leal, Meirinhos, Loureiro, and Marques (2017) confirm the 
scarcity of research on cyber security management and IC, a view also shared by Trkman 
and Desouza (2012). In the latter paper, the researchers highlight the existing trade-off 
between knowledge sharing and knowledge risks and propose their version of the data-
information-knowledge tripartite structure: data being the raw input to an interpretive 
process; information the aggregation of raw inputs plus application of processing 
techniques; and knowledge the collection of experiences, know-how, and ‘gut feelings’ that 
help employees make sense of information.
Among the first to do so, Bontis (1998) argues that organizations that securely 
protect their information possess high IC. La Torre, Dumay, and Rea (2018) revisit data, 
information, and knowledge processes and suggest that protection is needed across all 
components, for an organization to be able to defend its IC. This is demonstrated by the 
intrinsic relationship existing, for example, between privacy violations (individual level) and 
security incidents (organizational level) (La Torre et al., 2018). The authors suggest a 
framework whereby data breaches impact on IC’s traditional components: in particular, loss 
of confidentiality would affect HC, SC and RC; loss of integrity would affect HC and SC; and 
so would loss of availability. Questions around the potential impact that such losses of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability could have on all IC components remain. A more 
complete framework linking IC and information security is proposed by Renaud et al. (2019), 
who extend Von Solms and Von Solms’ work (2018) and align IC protection with 
information, knowledge and cyber security efforts in organizations.
2.2 Technology adoption and Intellectual Capital in universities
As organizations tasked with innovating and producing research, universities epitomize 
institutions replete with intangible IC assets (Paloma Sánchez and Elena, 2006). In the 
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current wake of digitization, these institutions have a privileged position in exploring 
technology affordances and constraints, that is to say the potential for action offered by 
digital technologies, based on users’ intentions (Nambisan et al., 2017). The three main 
categories of university users are students, academics and professional staff. As 
protagonists of the HE experience, students epitomize the affordances of digital 
technologies in universities: these ‘learners of the digital era’ (Rapetti and Cantoni, 2010) 
seamlessly utilize the same technologies for both social and academic purposes. To name a 
few examples, Whatsapp therefore becomes a way to connect with friends, but also 
facilitates coordination of group assignments; the tablet is now the preferred note taking 
tool during lectures; and social networks are used to share various documents as well as to 
coordinate and socialize (Gallardo Echenique et al., 2015). 
Academic departments and laboratories abound with technology-driven 
experiments with PhD students and researchers exploring applications of a variety of 
technologies in different contexts. Digital artefacts (components, applications or media 
contents that offer a specific functionality to end-users), platforms (shared sets of services 
to host complementary offerings) and infrastructures (tools and systems for 
communication, collaboration and/or computing to enhance innovation) (Nambisan, 2017) 
are not only present in ICT-intensive departments (e.g., Computing Science and Engineering) 
but also in disciplines that were traditionally less attached to the usage of cutting-edge 
technologies (e.g., Social Sciences and Humanities). Examples of modern technology 
adoption trends by academics and professional staff members in universities include the 
exponential growth of HE institutions’ presence on social media and the creation of 
dedicated contents for communication and marketing purposes (digital artefacts); the 
adoption of interactive, educational platforms to enhance the learning and teaching 
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experiences (digital platforms, e.g. Blackboard); and the diffusion of cloud computing 
technologies to support collaborative research projects (digital infrastructures). 
Besides being at the heart of modern technology adoption trends, from a managerial 
perspective, universities face three specific challenges, namely (1) an increased demand for 
transparency on the use of funds, (2) a growing attention to social accountability as a result, 
among other, of greater autonomy, and (3) expanding competition resulting from reduced 
levels of funding (Secundo et al., 2016). 
In recent years, universities have seen a growth in their service portfolio beyond 
traditional teaching and research, in favor of the “third mission”: the need for HE 
institutions to open up to the external environment, by transferring knowledge to 
stakeholders such as private and public organizations, civil society and larger public, with 
the ultimate goal of fostering economic and social growth of their regions and countries 
(Paoloni et al., 2019; Mariani et al., 2018; Secundo et al., 2018; Etzkowitz et al., 2000). In the 
light of these trends, activities such as inter-organizational collaboration, open innovation, 
research commercialization and public engagement are rapidly diffusing in universities. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that HE institutions have attracted a great deal of research on IC 
and knowledge management practices in general, topics traditionally attached to private 
organizations (Secundo et al., 2015; Moustaghfir and Schiuma, 2013). IC approaches are 
increasingly utilized in universities as management tools, to measure, man ge and report on 
the value of intangibles (Elena-Pérez et al., 2011) , to the extent to which, according to the 
Observatory of European Universities, IC-related information should be compulsorily 
disclosed by universities (Sangiorgi and Siboni, 2017), a step perceived necessary to 
encourage efficiency, effectiveness and excellence in universities (Elena-Pérez et al., 2011).
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For the purposes of this research, an operationalization of the IC construct is 
required. The canonical, tripartite IC structure proposed by Bontis (1998) is the leading 
framework, with different nuances based on the individual studies. HC is varyingly defined 
as explicit and tacit knowledge of personnel (Ramírez et al., 2007) or intangible value in 
people’s c mpetencies (Leitner et al., 2014), and examples include the role of researchers 
and attracting the best professors and students (Secundo et al., 2015). SC is defined as 
explicit knowledge associated with internal processes (Ramírez et al., 2007) or intangible 
resources in the organization and examples include databases, intellectual property and 
research projects (Leitner et al., 2014) or publication records of researchers (Secundo et al., 
2015). RC is defined as the spectrum of relationships developed by universities (Ramírez et 
al., 2007) or intangible resources to generate value from internal and external relationships 
(Leitner et al., 2014) and examples include networks with other universities (Secundo et al., 
2015).
One of the most compelling challenges for organizations is to encode the existence 
of individually-held knowledge and record this as an organizational asset. For this purpose, 
IC’s main function is to organize knowledge resources in a manageable fashion, and this 
demonstrates the fundamental role of the human dimension of IC (Vagnoni and Oppi, 2015; 
Secundo et al., 2016). Due to its completeness and granularity, the present research utilizes 
Ramirez, Tejada, and Manzaneque’s operationalization of IC (2016) as the basis for its 
conceptual framework. Borrowing from prior work (Meritum Project, 2002; Hudson, 1993; 
Stewart, 1997; Mouritsen et al., 2001), the three authors combine different nuances to 
produce the following definition of IC, which we complement with a fourth dimension, 
connectivity between components (Mariani et al., 2018) (Table I).
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------------
Table I here
---------------
According to Low, Samkin, and Li (2015), universities mainly disclose information about HC 
and SC, and less about RC. In an Italian study, Sangiorgi and Siboni (2017)  found that Italian 
HE institutions prefer to disclose IC that is related to the university as an institution (SC), 
rather than IC associated with their staff members (HC). Among the benefits of IC reporting 
by universities, Ramirez, Tejada and Manzaneque (2016) include using IC disclosure as a 
management tool to allocate resources, define institutional strategies, prioritize tasks, etc.; 
and as a medium for external communication, to attract resources in exchange for 
accountability. The concept of IC disclosure entails considerations on how well universities 
protect their stock of tangibles and intangibles: data, information and knowledge. To this 
end, the next section briefly illustrates information security issues in universities.
2.3 Insecure IC in Universities? Data, information and knowledge security in Higher Education
The literature reviewed up to this point emphasizes how threats to the data, information 
and knowledge collected, stored and managed in HE institutions have the potential to 
jeopardize their stock of IC. Based on the type of data, information and knowledge affected, 
this can happen at the HC, SC (organizational and technological) and RC levels. 
Recent events have demonstrated how universities are seen as an increasingly more 
attractive target for cyber-criminals (Borgman, 2018; Chapman, 2019; Luker and Petersen, 
2003). An investigation conducted by The Times in the UK revealed that hundreds of cyber-
attacks have targeted top institutions including the Universities of Oxford and Warwick and 
University College London (Yeung and Bennett, 2017). In the United States, in January-July 
2016, MIT was subject to more than 35 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) campaigns 
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(Mejia, 2016). These attacks affect data security and potentially compromise universities’ SC 
(technological): by flooding targeted machines with random requests (data), they can 
compromise entire IT networks, effectively halting operations in universities. In so doing, 
DDoS attacks have the potential to affect HC (e.g., staff members’ personal information) as 
well as RC. 
Data security was also at the core of a recent, eminent cyber-attack perpetrated to 
the Australian National University: officials feared Chinese actors were behind the attack, in 
an attempt to recruit foreign students as informants, by acquiring their personal data (bank 
numbers, tax details, academic records and passport details) held by the university 
(McGowan, 2019). This case epitomizes a potential disruption of the university’s HC and RC. 
Besides DDoS attacks or theft of personal identity details (e.g., social security numbers in 
the US, an instance in which HC is directly affected), there is also growing concern around 
the potential for sensitive information to be stolen from universities and sold to foreign 
states, in a cyber-warfare scenario (Yeung and Bennett, 2017). This event has the potential 
to impact a university’s RC, by compromising established relationships with external 
stakeholders. As an example, knowledge security is jeopardized when external actors 
penetrate universities’ IT networks in an attempt to ‘steal’ intellectual property to gain 
commercial advantages (Field, 2019). Universities feature a unique level of embeddedness 
for their end-users, which magnifies the potential vulnerability of the HC-SC connection in 
HE institutions. 
Universities’ open-platform architecture makes them particularly vulnerable to 
external attacks, due to the numerous access points they offer and the extensive amount of 
data and information they hold at any given time (SC) (Liu et al., 2017). Once in a university 
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network, attackers can access the personal data of academics, students and professional 
staff (HC). With the expansion of activities in which universities are involved (third mission), 
the types of managed data increase, and the security of such data has become increasingly 
complex. As data stewards, universities must implement adequate governance mechanisms 
which are, at best, nascent in the university environment (Borgman, 2018). Furthermore, 
research also shows that diffusion of an adequate information security culture is still 
incomplete in universities (Hina and Dominic, 2016). 
Culturally speaking, the HE environment is characterized by a sense of intellectual 
freedom (Martin-Sardesai and Guthrie, 2018), which stimulates experimentation and open 
scholarly enquiry and pushes its actors towards information sharing, inter-organizational 
collaboration, international outreach and individual autonomy (Luker and Petersen, 2003). 
Security issues deriving from a university’s cultural stance have the potential to affect its SC 
(in particular, its organizational capital). A study on information security policies in HE has 
highlighted that personal usage of information and Internet access ranked tenth (second-
last) and eleventh (last) in a ranking on the topics mostly covered in information security 
policies implemented by universities worldwide (Doherty et al., 2009). The same two topics 
ranked significantly higher (respectively third and second) in a similar ranking in other 
industries, indicating the different relevance that these topics have.
IC is not the only form of capital to consider when examining the security of data, 
information and knowledge in universities. The costs associated with implementing 
information security are another issue that IT managers face in modern universities, where 
pressure on cost containment is often dominant (Collini, 2017). As a result, universities 
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frequently embrace the “least cost and least resistance” (Lane, 2007, p. 238) approach to 
information security, which can negatively impact their security performance.
3. Research framework
Our approach stems from the interpretive discourse in studying knowledge 
management practices (Schultze and Leidner, 2002). Stenmark (2000) argues that in the 
interpretive discourse, technology can be utilized to formalize tacit knowledge in 
organizations where collective action emerges in systems of distributed knowledge. The 
focus of investigations in interpretive studies is on information systems research. Based on 
this approach, our study adopted the research methods described in the next section.
Our research investigates the constituents of IC in universities, with a focus on how 
HE institutions can protect their HC, SC and RC. We adopt Ramirez, Tejada and 
Manzaneque’s (2016) tripartite structure of IC  and posit that HC has a predominant role in 
universities and a bi-directional relationship with RC (Secundo et al., 2016), and that SC, as 
instantiated in organizational and technological capital, has a support function (Vagnoni and 
Oppi, 2015; Bontis, 1998). To further operationalize our framework, we utilize Tien’s (2013) 
data-information-knowledge framing (see also Trkman and Desouza, 2012), in its non-
hierarchical version (Alavi and Leidner, 2001; Tuomi, 1999). In the present research, data, 
information and knowledge are considered as building blocks, instantiations of HC, SC and 
RC, whose security is essential to IC protection (Figure 1). 
------------
Figure 1 here
---------------
For example, consider a researcher at University A collaborating to carry out a study 
with a researcher at University B. They first collect data about the people they are studying, 
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which has to be secured, yet shared between the researchers (this is where SC becomes 
relevant). Such data can be secured using traditional information security techniques. As the 
researchers analyze their data, it becomes information, which also needs to be shared 
securely between the SC components of both universities. As the researchers work 
together, their personal relationship matures and becomes part of the RC of both 
universities. Next they collaborate and write a research paper together. Both now have 
knowledge that has grown from the information their study generated. The knowledge is 
part of the HC component of IC. Some is encoded within research publications, but much of 
the new knowledge will remain tacit and ephemeral: held within the two human actors’ 
minds.
3.1. Research design and methods
This study focused on unpacking issues associated with data, information and knowledge 
security, as perceived and represented by senior officials in Australian universities. The 
sample was specifically selected to involve individuals who held both strategic and 
operational roles. Over a period of months, commitment was obtained from individuals 
holding relevant posts within universities, via the network that represents them at a State 
level. 
Being focused on specific senior members with particular organizational responsibilities, 
the sample selection was partly purposive (Jupp, 2006) and convenience-based (Bryman and 
Bell, 2015). The final sample of participants consisted of nine senior officers (predominantly 
IT Directors, CIOs, and Cyber security Managers) from research-active, public, teaching 
universities, one from a private university and one holding an equivalent position in a public 
agency undertaking scientific research. Involved institutions were spread across three states 
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in Australia. Australia has 43 universities which are multi-disciplinary, self-governing, under 
federal or state and territory legislation, and granted responsibility for their own 
management. In recent years, Australian public universities have been pushed to adopt a 
corporate managerial approach (Christopher, 2014), characterized by efficient use of 
resources, enhanced institutional management, policy and planning, and increased number 
of stakeholders to satisfy (Martin-Sardesai and Guthrie, 2018). 
Stemming from an interpretivist approach (Patton, 2002), this research assumes that 
social reality is created by the interaction of social actors and researchers’ main task is to 
make sense of the collected data through interpretation, to gain understanding. Consistent 
with an interpretive discourse approach (Schultze and Leidner, 2002), our study is 
qualitative. The format of engagement was therefore designed around a semi-structured 
interview question set. Interview questions were formulated in an attempt to balance 
research requirements with knowledge and background of the interviewees (see Appendix 
1). None of the interviewees had experience with IC, but all had significant expertise in data, 
information and knowledge security, as either specialists in cyber security (e.g., security 
managers) or IT executives (e.g., IT Directors and CIOs). Interview questions mainly referred 
to data, information and knowledge security issues affecting HE institutions, with a view to 
unpacking their impact on the whole organization. To validate the questions, feedback on 
the research design was provided by the board of the network of universities’ IT Directors in 
one Australian State. Both the participant and the board confirmed clarity, pertinence and 
relevance of the research design and questions. The interviews took from 30 to 75 minutes 
and were recorded, with permission, and later fully transcribed to support content analysis 
by members of the research team. The research design was subject to institutional ethics 
approval. 
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3.2. Analysis
Interview analysis was conducted using abductive reasoning (Timmermans and Tavory, 
2012), whereby rigorous methodological analysis was used to explore interviewees’ 
personal, social and intellectual positions in relation to the topic. As such, rather than 
seeking confirmation of a priori categories of data, information and security risks derived 
from extant literature, the focus was on, “breaking down, examining, comparing, 
conceptualising and categorising data” (Corbin and Strauss, 2015) such that emergent 
classes of cyber security factors might be postulated, “by making connections between 
categories”  derived of individual experience. Content analysis of the transcribed interviews 
was conducted in two stages. The first involved close reading of the material to identify 
critical issues highlighted by participants and to group these under common categories. The 
identified categories were then abstracted to relate them to a smaller number of more 
general, conceptual classes (Miles and Huberman, 1984), using an iterative process of 
comparison and testing  (Spiggle, 1994). In order to avoid interpretive bias, two researchers 
independently coded the collected data and then compared and contrasted their coding, to 
identify discrepancies and gaps (Marshall and Rossman, 2011). The researchers then 
discussed cases of misaligned coding to find an agreement on the nature of the information 
portrayed by the excerpts under analysis before comparison and collation into a single 
report. To validate the findings, a synthetic presentation was submitted to the participants 
to collect feedback on missing elements and interpretation errors. 
The results of the analysis are outlined and discussed in the following section, in 
which we link participants’ understandings of data and information security risks to extant 
literature and theory on IC and its components.
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4. Findings
The 11 interviewees agreed that data, information and knowledge security represent a 
challenge, as demonstrated by the following excerpt: 
“You will never going to be on the front foot from a cyber-perspective…the only thing 
that will give you absolute security and control is disconnecting from the Internet and 
you put your technology in Fort Knox.” (Resp. 1)
This excerpt also sets the tone for considering technology as an SC element (in particular as 
a technological capital component). The following sub-section exemplifies data, information 
and knowledge security issues associated with the individual dimension of IC, HC.
5.1 Human Capital
Data revealed several security threats in universities related to the experience, 
perceptions and skills of individuals. Most interviewees agreed on the challenge constituted 
by spear phishing (e.g., interviewee 10) and, in general, social engineering (“almost on a 
weekly basis”, as indicated by interviewee 2) as sophisticated ways of exploiting individuals’ 
propensity to fall for enticing messages (e.g., emails and messages on social media), for the 
purpose of extorting personal information (e.g., credit card details). In universities, spear 
phishing targets all stakeholders, including students, academics nd professional staff, and 
its effectiveness is influenced by the ability of such individuals to recognize it and act 
accordingly (for example, reporting a suspicious email to the IT department). Spear phishing 
and social engineering rely on information attackers gather about their victims to perpetrate 
targeted attacks. They therefore represent instances of information security impacting HC. 
In order to gauge the effect that the individual approach to security has on the 
overall stock of IC in the university, one of the interview questions required participants to 
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elaborate on the nature of data and information security, identifying them as being 
intrinsically more human or more technical. Interviewees’ answers had a two-fold focus: on 
the one hand, participants elaborated on organizational vulnerability to cyber-threats, an 
aspect stemming from a SC perspective (organizational capital). However, despite 
acknowledging the relevance of the technological components (e.g., effectiveness of 
malwares and structural weaknesses of security architectures), interviewees mainly agreed 
on its predominantly human-related nature (e.g., “…humans are the problem”, interviewee 
10). In particular, the topic of end-point vulnerability was extensively discussed:
“The consequences of not following good cyber-security practices are probably not 
well understood.” (Resp. 9)
“With the amount of spear-phishing attacks we had in the last six months…we had all 
the technology sorted, but the way they got in, it’s the human clicking…” (Resp. 5)
The findings presented so far mainly refer to unintentional behaviors by individuals. Several 
participants also discussed instances in which researchers who operate in research-specific 
environments that require stability and control, oppose structural security practices, such as 
software patching, which could compromise the integrity of their data (SC, technological 
capital). In the case of PhD students, research usually lasts three years and more, and a lack 
of updates over such an extensive timeframe could pose serious security consequences. This 
tension was represented as follows:
“We regularly get pushed back by researchers saying: ‘Your controls are too tight; we 
can’t run software or do the experimentation we want to do.’” (Resp. 1)
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HC includes consideration of the motivation to act (or not to act) in given ways by 
individuals operating in organizations. Among the most common difficulties that the IT 
security team encounters is the complacent attitude of some employees, who do not value 
data and information security and perceive it as a distraction from their core business. In 
association with instances of SC (e.g., in its organizational form, organizational culture), a 
change in the security attitude of the university was described by most interviewees as a 
slow process. One of the problematic aspects was the disconnect between individuals and 
information security, as represented in the following passage:
“The message should be that cyber security is about enabling digital transformation 
to occur. In this way, cyber security would become more meaningful to [people]…but 
now [cyber security] is portrayed as cyber-terrorism…and people disconnect from 
this.” (Resp. 2)
Nonetheless, several interviewees acknowledged that their organizations were changing 
towards a view of cyber security, not as a liability, but as a source of competitive advantage. 
This translated into significant differences across universities in terms of staff members 
dedicated to information security (“…some universities may have 3-4 people. I’ve got 15 and 
a multi-million dollar budget”; interviewee 7). This HC element contributes to the 
university’s SC.
Specific analysis was needed for insider threats, another highly debated topic, 
reflective of a noteworthy debate in many industries. Interviewees mentioned that this 
threat could possibly take two forms: as the result of malicious behaviors by individuals; or 
as unintentional acts committed by employees. Data revealed that the latter is most 
prevalent:
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“Insiders are not necessarily working for a criminal organization […] it’s actually more 
internal people making poor cyber security judgement.” (Resp. 6)
Based on their origin, insider threats can be considered reflective of sub-optimal HC (for 
example, resulting from poor knowledge of information security or insufficient motivation 
to behave securely) or from adverse effects of RC (for example, when an employee 
unwittingly acts upon direction of external, criminal organizations intending to target a 
specific university). Findings ascribed to the field of HC demonstrate close connections with 
SC, the topic of the next section.
5.2 Structural Capital
In general terms, several interviewees agreed that the attack surface of universities is 
expanding (“…organizations are increasing their cyber security footprint…”; interviewee 2). 
This is due to an increasingly multi-modal environment, which significantly spreads data 
distribution (e.g., BYOD; interviewee 9) and raises further challenges in terms of balancing 
individuals’ use of personal devices (HC) with corporate systems (SC). In association with a 
university’s RC, progressively longer supply chains and flexible outsourcing arrangements 
seem to push the center of gravity of security controls away from the university premises. In 
this scenario, it becomes more difficult for IT security teams to identify and monitor 
potential back doors (interviewee 1), as these may fall outside organizational boundaries.
In contrast, several interviewees acknowledged the greater flexibility that solutions 
like cloud computing (technological capital) provide, enabling employees to work remotely, 
in a variety of locations, together with maintaining the integrity and reliability of their data 
and information. Cloud computing was also described as generally efficient, with the 
potential to alleviate the financial burden on capital expenditure (CAPEX) and shift it to 
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operating expenditure (OPEX). This last point, in the interviewees’ words, makes investment 
in cloud computing (as opposed, for example, to on-premises data centers) more appealing 
from a business perspective.
Several interviewees acknowledged the diffusion of IoT in universities. While 
recognizing the benefits of real-time data collection deriving from this SC component 
(technological capital), participants also indicated that its misuse could potentially lead to 
serious breaches (for example, more effective Distributed-Denial-of-Service attacks, DDoS; 
e.g., interviewees 3, 5, and 10), especially considering that universities host an extensive 
amount of always connected devices (e.g., sensors in medical laboratories and robots, but 
also more traditional devices such as printers, CCTV, etc.). An aspect of IoT that was 
indicated as particularly concerning for universities, was the increasing exposure deriving 
from the growing interconnection between the physical and the digital world (“…the 
convergence between the information technology and the operating technology”; 
interviewee 2) that IoT enables.
“IoT is a growing concern: it captures larger amounts of data, imagine for example 
for research purposes, but there will always be ways to exploit such data.” (Resp. 3)
Concerns around IoT epitomized an underlying issue mentioned by numerous interviewees, 
the juxtaposition of present-day IT capabilities with legacy-systems that are still largely 
present in modern universities (a technological capital issue, SC). One participant illustrated 
the contagion effect intrinsic to having a previously physical-only, standalone device, for 
which data and information security was not activated by default, transformed into a 
gateway for a larger digital network (interviewee 5). On the same topic, interviewee 3 
explained that architectures with default security can be more easily developed utilizing 
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green-field components, as opposed to legacy ones. In this interviewee’s words, the latter 
can only have “tagged-on” (and not default) security.
Besides the role of technology in protecting (or jeopardizing) the security of data, 
information and knowledge in universities, participants elaborated on another component 
of SC, namely organizational practices and structures aimed at preserving the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information (organizational capital). These 
arguments often revolved around the consideration of whether information security could 
be considered an operational or a strategic activity performed by universities. Consistent 
with current debates in other industries, interviewees agreed that a “strategic turn” is 
indeed necessary for information security to receive the necessary consideration in 
universities. In the interviewees’ words, one of the most powerful leverages to ease this 
transition is raising awareness around the destructive impact of security breaches.
In close connection with RC, reputational risks are generally perceived as particularly 
significant for universities, especially with the current, expanding student bases. 
Interviewees explained that the reputational aspect of data and information security is 
particularly debated in the board of directors’ meetings (SC, organizational capital). Such 
conversations refer to the essence itself of HE institutions as organizations tasked with 
diffusing knowledge (as well as protecting it). Consequently, their value is eminently 
strategic (knowledge security issue affecting SC).
However, most participants believed that data and information security are still seen 
as an operational, rather than a strategic issue, in the sense of conducive of shifts in the 
competitive balance. Because of this, interviewees concluded that data and information 
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security is perceived as a risk management issue, for which mitigation attracts the most 
effort in terms of SC.
“I think for an organization such as ours, [information security] is still a risk 
management issue, I think it will drive eventually towards strategic, but it’s 
something that is a cultural change and I think it takes time.” (Resp. 5)
This scenario could mutate if a major security incident happened, which would likely push a 
change in mindset, as witnessed by interviewee 3. However, with a lack of practical 
examples on the implications that a security breach could have, interviewees explained that 
justifying information security expenditure is a challenging task, especially when the board 
of directors and the IT security team speak different languages, with the former more 
business-minded and the latter more technically-oriented.
“As an IT manager, how do you communicate with company directors in non-
technical ways, as they usually do not come from an IT background?” (Resp. 3)
Generally, interviewees agreed that return on investment on information security is difficult 
to demonstrate and several of them argued that their board of directors might prefer to 
take some limited risks, rather than over-investing in information security. One of the 
arguments to justify this stance was that growth is enabled by taking acceptable levels of 
risk, especially in the university sector, naturally prone to technology adoption and 
innovation. In the same direction, data and information security, as with any other risk 
management investment, may require significant investment and not deliver quantifiable 
results, other than avoiding major losses.
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“The boards of directors are looking at growth, and there is no growth without 
risk…and sometimes they might go: ‘Is IT crying wolf yet again?’… It’s a very fine 
line.” (Resp. 1)
Concerns were also raised about the potentially cyclical pattern of information security 
investments, whereby the current hype around cyber security could wane when other 
priorities emerge:
“Maybe in two years’ time someone may be: ‘Well, security had enough money in the 
last years, now it’s time to invest in something else.’” (Resp. 11)
5.3 Relational Capital
The complex relationships that u iversities have with service providers emerged in our 
interviews, especially in the field of data and information security. Service level agreements 
allow IT departments to ensure some level of control over vendors’ activities, at least in 
terms of business continuity management in case of a breach of contractual terms. Contract 
management was therefore considered a crucial component of data and information 
security, to the point that one participant argued that one of the main duties of the IT 
department is managing vendors (RC), and not IT itself (interviewee 5).
Interviewees also indicated that one way to ensure enhanced control is to only 
engage with vendors based in Australia, in order to keep data onshore and ensure 
compliance with Australian legislation. The interviews, however, showed that effective 
contract management is a challenge, mainly due to the difficulty in assessing vendors’ 
security performance. One interviewee argued that they would love to be able to 
completely outsource their information security function, should they identify a vendor 
capable of assuring outstanding security at a reasonable price (interviewee 3). Finally, on a 
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higher level of abstraction, when discussing contract management, several interviewees 
elaborated on an essential component of RC, trust, and the role it has in managing contracts 
with third-parties:
“In cloud services, trust is earned.” (Resp. 5)
“[Third-party] contracts are a proxy for trust, but they’re not a perfect one.” (Resp. 3)
Regardless of the level of trust embedded in the delivery of security services, interviewees 
expressed concerns around the erosion of control (and security) that apparently comes with 
technological solutions such as cloud applications (technological capital that impacts RC), as 
witnessed in the following excerpt:
“Cloud computing is a reality of life, and it’s a two-edged sword as it offers 
benefits…But you also lose some controls…when the updates are being done? How 
do you manage your data…how do you know how secure [the vendor] is?” (Resp. 3)
Interviewees also discussed the implications of the current push for internationalization in 
HE. The increase in international travel requires consideration of the security repercussions 
of their carrying and utilizing university-owned devices on these trips. One mentioned an 
instance where researchers accessed public Wi-Fi networks in foreign countries where cyber 
security regulations were less stringent (interviewee 4).
5.4 Other data, information and knowledge security issues
The interconnected nature of IC’s components was confirmed, in the form of topics whose 
nature cuts across HC, SC and RC. Several interviewees discussed the importance of data 
and information security awareness in universities and described it as an organizational 
reaction (SC, organizational capital) to phenomena that are eminently individual (HC). 
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Interviewees said that, at the end-point level, the university environment exhibits its 
diversity, with several categories of users coming from different cultural backgrounds and 
having different views on data and information security (e.g., “…we manage over 100,000 
identities”; interviewee 7). From the interviews, it became clear that this complexity renders 
a standardized, one-size-fits-all approach to end-point security only partially effective. 
Consequently, interviewees stressed the importance of working on the individual 
information security awareness (HC) to enhance the security culture of all users (SC, 
organizational capital). Interviewees mentioned different practices used in their universities 
to raise information security awareness. All, however, agreed that such practices need to be 
complementary, and the best way to increase awareness is by providing a mixture of 
methods:
“We try to keep [information security] front of mind, it’s a deliberate campaign, but 
it’s not just posters splashed around the walls, it’s more a mindset of a culture about 
whatever we do, it needs to be safe.” (Resp. 4)
Interviewee 9 explained that in their organization, a first approach to information security 
awareness is the launching of internal campaigns, organizing of events, and conducting 
information security training in general (SC, organizational capital). A second phase requires 
one-on-one contact with the university players, for the IT security managers to account for 
the diversity of their customers (e.g., academics and students) and customize information 
security awareness to their needs and capabilities (interaction between SC and HC). 
However, the generally scarce resources dedicated to information security render this 
exercise hardly sustainable, considering the high number of individuals to approach. As a 
result, as mentioned by one interviewee, often external media reports on eminent cyber-
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breaches (potentially impacted by the stock of RC a university holds) have a higher impact 
on employees than internal training practices.
Considerations were made by interviewees on the availability of knowledge held by 
internal and external actors, with current trends potentially posing relevant challenges for 
the “defenders”. In general, participants noted that malicious tools on the dark web (in 
particular, re-purposed government surveillance tools) are relatively easy to access and use, 
which increases the number of potential attackers and gives them a competitive edge over 
IT security managers (interviewee 3).
“Anyone can be a hacker. Kids coming out of school have much more IT knowledge 
than people that just graduated a couple of years ago.” (Resp. 4)
External factors did not only refer to the malicious intentions of attackers, but also to the 
surrounding social, economic and legal environment and how this has the potential to 
impact IC in universities. One of the interview questions asked interviewees to elaborate on 
the impact that legislation (such as the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme, which obliges 
organizations affected by data and information security breaches to disclose them: 
www.oiac.gov.au/privacy/notifiable-data-breaches) would have on data and information 
security. Opinions on this matter were generally aligned around the positive impact that 
such legislation would have on raising awareness on security, by impacting the knowledge of 
information security held by individuals (HC).
5. Discussion
Our investigation confirmed the challenge of securing data, information and knowledge 
within universities. From an IC perspective, universities are characterized by the prominence 
of HC, whereby knowledge residing with individuals is influenced by their role within the 
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organization and by their backgrounds (e.g., prior experience and culture). Given the variety 
of profiles existing in universities, ranging from specific roles (e.g., academics, professional 
staff, students, other stakeholders) to cultural differences (e.g., the push to 
internationalization, which has broadened the spectrum of cultures operating in HE), HC 
takes numerous forms, and its assessment has to account for such variety. 
An interesting finding of our research relates to the impact that sub-optimal 
knowledge at the individual level has on the security of data and information in universities. 
Participants in our interviews emphasized the fact that end-users in universities have very 
different understanding of information security practices. Behaviors that, for some, may be 
legitimate (e.g., sharing data on non-accredited cloud platforms), are, to others, a clear 
violation of corporate security policies. Therefore, individual knowledge qualitatively 
impacts the overall amount of HC (and, by implication, IC) in a university, which suggests 
that assessing HC requires reflecting on the adequacy/non-adequacy of individual tacit 
knowledge in an organization, not just its binary presence/absence. This finding is consistent 
with literature stressing the importance of calculating HC loss (besides acquisition) in HE 
institutions (Martin-Sardesai and Guthrie, 2018).  
On this note, a first conceptual bridge between HC and SC is revealed by our 
research. IT managers highlighted the importance of information security training in 
establishing (and then elevating) shared security awareness, a level playing field among end-
users in universities: such training, as codified knowledge existing in an organization (SC) is 
used to influence and improve tacit knowledge held at the individual level (HC). Vice versa, 
the quality of individual knowledge serves as a scale to weight and customize security 
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training programs and courses. This suggests that HC and SC have a symbiotic relationship in 
universities. 
The present research postulated that data and information, together with 
knowledge, constitute instantiations of HC. The results of our analysis demonstrate that, by 
virtue of a diffused ethos of academic freedom and the multi-modal nature of universities 
(Borgman, 2018; Martin-Sardesai and Guthrie, 2018), individuals enjoy a significant level of 
control over the data and information they collect and store and the knowledge they 
produce in HE institutions. Compared to other public and private organizations, the 
boundaries between individual and organizational intellectual property are fuzzier, to the 
point in which HC created in one university in the form of data or information (e.g., a 
research project), could be translated into knowledge in another university (e.g., when the 
investigator moves to another university). Similarly, the resulting knowledge could be 
formalized as SC in a third university (e.g., when the investigator moves to another 
university and publishes a paper based on previously conducted research). These dynamics 
highlight, once again, the challenges related to HC and SC protection in HE.
Defined as “knowledge that stays within the firm at the end of the working day” 
(Meritum Project, 2002, p. 11), SC represents the purest organizational form of knowledge 
present in a university. Due to their roles, our interviewees mainly elaborated on two 
elements of SC: technology and organizational practices to secure data, information and 
knowledge. Our findings highlight the need for a combination of the two. In particular, the 
need to complement traditional, technical defenses (e.g., IT security architecture) with 
organizational, human-focused interventions (e.g., awareness campaigns) is widely 
recognized in universities, and so is skepticism for a centralized, one-size-fits-all solution. 
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This is consistent with recommendations in the literature that HE institutions should avoid 
centralized information security models typical of corporate IT departments in favor of 
“embraced autonomy” (Adler, 2006, p. 58), a model that aligns universities’ asymmetric 
structure with active participation and engagement in the information security efforts by 
their constituents (e.g., campuses, branches, colleges, departments, etc.). Conceptually, 
investing in technology and advisable security practices translates into SC investments. Our 
research suggests that senior IT managers utilize this framing as a promising perspective for 
conversations around information security budgeting with university management, perhaps 
more receptive to a business-based approach to security.
The existing literature argues for a supporting role of SC, which facilitates the 
development of HC and RC (Vagnoni and Oppi, 2015; Bontis, 1998). Data collected in this 
research seem to align with this: interviewees extensively discussed the functional role of 
technology and organizational practices in promoting organizational activities and in 
building a solid network of external stakeholders. Similar to HC, SC is instantiated through 
data, information and knowledge at the organizational level: for example, a research 
dataset owned by a university department; a scientific report elaborated from such dataset; 
and the associated expertise residing within a research team. Again, assessing SC entails 
evaluating the quality (and not just the quantity or size) of the data, information and 
knowledge produced at the SC level. Interestingly, however, negative events affecting SC 
and its instantiations seem to have the potential for greater adverse effects than similar 
events affecting HC: an example is the case in which an ill-designed information security 
policy is disseminated through training throughout the university, or a malicious external 
agent (e.g., a hacker) has access to a database of login credentials. This further corroborates 
the view of SC as an essential supportive component. 
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Universities’ roles as innovation hubs within an ecosystem of public and private 
organizations, civil society and other constituencies pertains to their RC, a topic only 
recently discussed in the field of HE (Paoloni et al., 2019). The emergence of universities’ 
third mission (Etzkowitz et al., 2000) has brought increased focus on how to secure the 
portion of IC deriving from connections with the other institutions. Several interviewees 
demonstrated heightened awareness of issues associated with the protection of intellectual 
property. Similar to HC and SC, this element entails the need to strengthen RC in 
universities, and not merely to report on its presence/absence in a binary fashion. The 
acknowledgement of an increased role for universities in national and international 
ecosystems comes with the growing importance that reputation, as one of the foundations 
of trust, has for such institutions. In this sense, a breach in the data, information and 
knowledge security systems of universities can trigger significant negative consequences 
such as lost trust, reputational damage and impaired RC. Unlike La Torre, Dumay and Rea 
(2018), we argue that regardless of data breaches’ nature (as loss of confidentiality, integrity 
or availability of information), impacts on RC through reputational damage are always 
possible and always significant.
Our study unpacked the relationships between the three IC components and their 
substantiations: data, information, and knowledge, from an information security 
perspective. Unsurprisingly, given the intangible nature of knowledge, considerations 
around the latter emerged to a lesser extent from the participants’ interviews. The majority 
of the collected data were coded around data and information security. As for the tripartite 
structure of IC, the spread of data was more consistent, with HC attracting slightly more 
statements. We synthesize our findings in Table II, to exemplify instances of data, 
information and knowledge security within HC, SC and RC, in the form of interview excerpts, 
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emerging themes and hypothetical, real-world examples outside the collected data. We 
have provided the latter to fill ‘gaps’ that participants’ statements did not address.
   ------------
Table II here
---------------
Our investigation emphasized how the very organizational boundaries of universities appear 
vaguer, as compared to other public and private organizations. Based on our data, we have 
identified two types of “embeddedness” that characterize the organizational fabric of 
universities. Vertical embeddedness refers to the integration that different categories of 
end-users (mainly students, academics, professional staff and stakeholders “sitting on the 
fence”) have within a university. Vertical embeddedness manifests at both the HC and SC 
levels. In terms of HC, universities have different categories of end-users; traditional 
provider-costumer roles are ill-defined, and students are arguably at the same time clients 
(they pay fees) and providers (they produce knowledge, HC that becomes formalized as SC). 
Moreover, individuals have different levels of understanding and perceptions of data 
and information security. In terms of SC, they all have access to basic shared facilities and 
technologies and all should act upon established security policies and practices. The 
dynamics associated with vertical embeddedness originate at the HC level but, given the 
configuration of universities, have the potential for adverse events such as data and 
information security breaches at the SC level. To tackle this, the different degrees of 
understanding of information security (HC) would require a customized approach to 
information security management (e.g., training, SC). Yet, this usually does not happen in 
universities; training is administered using a blanket approach that does not feasibly 
account for stakeholder nuances. Horizontal embeddedness refers to the inter-
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organizational integration that exists across HE institutions and other public and private 
organizations, in the light of increasing international collaboration and third mission 
activities. Horizontal embeddedness manifests at both the RC and SC levels. In terms of RC, 
universities promote practices such as students being involved in international exchange 
programs; academics sharing and publishing anonymized datasets and co-producing 
research across countries, or being invited as visiting academics to different institutions; and 
non-academic staff members working on strategic partnerships around topics such as 
accreditation or education delivery (e.g., Massive Open Online Courses, MOOCs). In terms of 
SC, these practices are accompanied by supportive efforts, and investments, such as the 
award of joint degrees, the creation of shared IT networks (for example, Eduroam: 
www.eduroam.org), the constitution of grants aimed at promoting international 
collaboration, the promotion of knowledge exchange with public and private companies, 
etc. The dynamics of horizontal embeddedness originate at the RC level, but have the 
potential for data and information security breaches to manifest at the SC. Figure 2 
represents the relationships among vertical and horizontal embeddedness and the 
components of IC.
------------
Figure 2 here
---------------
In summary, vertical embeddedness in universities has the potential to enrich these 
organizations’ stock of HC, by increasing the number and variety of tacit and explicit 
“knowledge nodes” in the network (e.g., knowledge created in a project where an 
academic’s expertise is combined with a student’s propensity to innovate, as supported by a 
competent professional staff members who suggest funding opportunities). This can in turn 
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increase SC (e.g., organizational capital such as research outputs) and RC (e.g., impactful 
research attractive to external players). On the other hand, the diffusion of nodes in the 
university network increases the university’s digital footprint and presents data and security 
issues, with the potential, through the contagion effect, to disrupt SC (technological, but 
also organizational capital) and in turn RC (e.g., loss of reputation). The same applies to 
horizontal embeddedness, whereby close connections with external stakeholders multiply 
value-creation opportunities (e.g., knowledge transfer), increasing the stock of SC (e.g., 
practitioners’ seminars guided by academics) and HC (e.g., academics benefit from real-
world exposure). At the same time, horizontal embeddedness creates opportunities for 
security issues to emerge as a result of shared IT networks and infrastructures. Contagion 
could ensue, and so could disruption of SC and, in, turn HC.
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5.1 Research implications
The conceptual framework we utilized is based on the tripartite IC structure proposed by 
Ramirez, Tejada, and Manzaneque (2016). The framework was reliably mirrored in the data 
offered by the participants, in particular in the division of SC in technological and 
organizational capital. 
The implications of our findings are, first, that the roles played by the actors in 
universities have the potential to impact the quality of HC held by the university at any given 
moment. We therefore recommend that future studies on HC in HE account for the typical 
university profiles (students, academics, professional staff and other stakeholders) and their 
specificity vis-a-vis the contribution to HC (vertical embeddedness). 
Second, the specific characteristics of organizations and other constituencies 
interacting with universities have the potential to influence the quality of RC. Profiling such 
characteristics in a discrete taxonomy (horizontal embeddedness) is a much more complex 
task than for HC, and we recommend that, at least, future studies assessing RC in HE 
consider the relationships between a university and its external partners based on the 
nature of the involved activities: teaching, research, service, and third mission. 
Third, we suggest that future studies aimed at assessing SC in universities account for 
the role and influence of HC and RC. Our research also demonstrated that framing data, 
information, and knowledge as substantiations of IC’s components is a promising approach.
 We have ‘problematized’ these concepts by exploring the associated security issues, 
a currently ‘hot’ topic in HE. The information security literature has concluded that data 
breaches are not just a technical issue to be dealt with by IT departments (von Solms and 
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von Solms, 2004). The acknowledgment of the human and organizational side of 
information security has been accompanied by significant calls for researchers to further 
unpack the human and managerial determinants of data breaches (Siponen et al., 2014; 
Soomro et al., 2016). An IC approach shows promise, in particular if preceded by a solid 
exploration of the extent to which data, information and knowledge (as either a hierarchical 
trio or a homogeneous group) contribute to the different components of IC.
From a practical perspective, our study demonstrates that IC protection is not 
possible without data, information and knowledge security. As knowledge-intensive 
organizations, if universities want to maintain their competitive edge, they need to improve 
the ways in which they protect their data, information and knowledge, both tacit and 
codified. At the same time, as mentioned by several interviewees, HE’s proneness to 
embrace technology adoption and innovation (Nambisan et al., 2017; Nambisan, 2017) 
requires these institutions to balance security (as controls and barriers, but also as culture) 
with openness, a dichotomy demonstrated by the horizontal/vertical embeddedness levels 
proposed in this investigation. 
Ultimately, this research provides senior IT security managers with an original 
framework to illustrate the potential adverse effects that poor data, information and 
knowledge security may have on universities’ IC, as declined in its three components. Such 
framework can be fruitfully utilized to substantiate these concepts before executive 
members in universities, who do not necessarily have solid knowledge in information 
security management.
5.2 Limitations
Similar to any other, research, our study has limitations. 
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First, the adopted key informant methodology has the potential to suffer from 
potential biases (Kumar et al., 1993). We interviewed senior IT managers and executives, 
who have predominantly contributed in the fields of SC and HC. However, their function is 
embedded in the component of IC around which HC and RC pivot. Their selection was 
considered an efficient way to gather meaningful information, conducive of a holistic view 
on IC. Yet it must be acknowledged that our sample represents around 25% of the 
population of Australian universities from three (out of 7) States and Territories in the 
country. 
Second, our findings should be confirmed by means of a quantitative investigation. A 
large-scale survey designed around the results of the present paper is a possible avenue.
Third, our results represent the Australian case. Given the impact of country-specific 
factors (e.g., legislation, governance in HE, funding models, etc.), similar studies should be 
carried out in other countries, in particular to explore the usage of IC as a reporting and 
management tool (Elena-Pérez et al., 2011), but also as a tool for external communication 
(Sangiorgi and Siboni, 2017; Ramirez et al., 2016), a topic that usually attracts significant 
attention in information security management. 
6. Conclusions and Future Research
This research demonstrates a degree of complexity of IC security in HE institutions that goes 
beyond the tripartite structure of IC. We unpacked the elements of HC, SC and RC, 
confirming, as argued in the literature (Vagnoni and Oppi, 2015; Mariani et al., 2018), the 
importance of the relationships between such components (connectivity) as a fourth 
element. Our research explored the connection existing between IC and its various 
instantiations in universities’ data, information and knowledge, highlighting the crucial 
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nature of information security structures and measures in protecting the organization’s IC 
and ensuring that they can benefit from this crucial asset. 
Future research is recommended to replicate the study in other countries, to control 
for possible factors associated with state legislation. To this end, we have plans to conduct a 
similar study in universities and research centers in the UK and US. We also plan to explore 
the exact relationships between the concepts of data, information and knowledge; the 
collected data could not provide a definite answer to the question whether a hierarchical 
order exists or whether some other, more complex relationships better describe how these 
concepts interact.
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Table I: Ramirez, Tejada, and Manzaneque’s definitions of IC components in universities, 
expanded with other sources for further details (indicated) (2016)
Component 
of IC
Definition (and sources) Examples in universities
Human 
Capital
Explicit and tacit knowledge of 
university staff. 
Knowledge that employees take 
with them when they leave the 
firm: individuals’ genetic 
inheritance, education, 
experience, attitudes, knowledge, 
abilities, skills, and motivation 
(Meritum Project, 2002; Hudson, 
1993).
Academics, students, PhD 
students, professional staff, 
research fellows, career 
pathways.
Structural 
Capital 
(Organization
al and 
Technologica
l capital)
Explicit knowledge relating to 
processes of dissemination, 
communication and management 
of knowledge. Divided in:
- Organizational capital: 
operational university 
environment, with its research 
activities, management, 
processes, corporate culture, 
organizational routines, etc.
- Technological capital: 
technological resources including 
databases, licenses, software, 
archives, etc.
Research outputs (publications 
and patents); knowledge 
creation processes and 
projects (seminars and 
research projects); impact and 
artefacts of scientific research 
(best practices, integrated 
research centers, guidelines 
and protocols, records, 
databases); outputs of teaching 
(training); educational outputs.
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Relational 
Capital
Economic, political and 
institutional relations with external 
stakeholders.
Resources related to external 
relations with consumers, users, 
partners, and stakeholders; value 
of a company’s franchise 
(Stewart, 1997; Mouritsen et al., 
2001).
Relations with regional, 
national and international 
commissions; associations and 
scientific societies; spin-offs; 
non-affiliated academics in 
universities; social context and 
volunteering sector.
Page 58 of 62Journal of Intellectual Capital
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Intellectual Capital
Table II: A synthesis of data, information and knowledge security issues emerging from the research, as themes emerging from the data (regular font), interviews’ excerpts 
(italics) or hypothetical, real-world examples not directly discussed in the interviews (in [ ] brackets).
Data Security Information Security Knowledge Security
Spear phishing and social 
engineering
[despite hard to configure, this 
instance could be the case in which 
a criminal organisation ‘poaches’ a 
researcher away from a university 
after discovering their unique 
knowledge through illicit means] 
End-point vulnerability
Data and information security not always perceived as core business
Insider threats (malicious and unintentional)
IoT and BYOD misuse
Human Capital
“…we manage over 100,000 identities”
Structural 
Capital
“The consequences of not following good cyber-security practices are 
probably not well understood.”
Organisational policies and practices in data and information securityOrganisational
Reputational aspects associated 
with knowledge protection, as 
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Data Security Information Security Knowledge Security
discussed in board meetings
“As an IT manager, how do you 
communicate with company 
directors in non-technical ways, as 
they usually do not come from an 
IT background?”
“Maybe in two years’ time someone may be: ‘Well, security had enough money in the last years, now it’s time 
to invest in something else.’”
“The only thing that will give you 
absolute security … is 
disconnecting from the Internet and 
you put your technology in Fort 
Knox”
[an attacker exploits a vulnerability 
in an interactive educational 
platform to appropriate teaching 
materials about a piece of 
technology under development, 
with significant commercial 
potential]
Some software patching could 
compromise researchers’ working 
environment
Technological
Universities’ increasing attack surface
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Data Security Information Security Knowledge Security
Structural weaknesses of security architectures
DDoS attacks
Contagion effects caused by the presence of green-field and legacy systems simultaneously
Insider threats guided by external agents to capture knowledge and IP
Longer supply chains and complex outsourcing arrangements
External media reports on eminent 
cyber-breaches
Relational 
Capital
“Anyone can be a hacker. Kids 
coming out of school have much 
more IT knowledge than people 
that just graduated a couple of 
years ago.”
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Interview schema:
After reading the participant information sheet and signing the consent form to agree 
to voluntarily participate in the semi-structured interview and having the interview 
recorded by the researcher, participants were asked several prompting questions. 
Given the semi-structured interviews format, participants were allowed to elaborate on 
their answers beyond a strict reply to the question. Based on this, the researchers 
could ask follow-up questions on a case-by-case basis, which are not included among 
the following prompting questions:
• What are the current and future cyber-threats that your organisation is facing 
and will likely face in the future?
• What do you think are the critical data and information security risks for your 
organization?
• What factors, in the present, lead you to believe that each of these is critical?
• How do data and information security risks currently inform strategic decision-
making in your organization? Why?
• Do you think information security is a human or a technical issue? Why?
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• What do you think will be the impact of the Notifiable Data Breaches scheme1?
• If you had the ‘magic wand’, what would you do to help your organisation with 
managing its information securely?
1 The Australian legislation that mandates public disclosure of data breaches by public and private organisations, 
entered into force in February 2017.
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